主讲人：墨尔本大学商业与经济学院 邵鲁生 副教授
报告题目：Competitive Contract Design in a Retail Supply Chain Under Demand Uncertainty
报告摘要：This paper studies the design of contracts involving a single retailer and multiple competing manufacturers who supply substitutable products in a retail context. The contracts are signed before the demand environment is known, and the retail prices and orders are determined when more information about demand is available. We develop a two-stage Stackelberg model to study the retailer's product selection and pricing decisions and the manufacturers' contract design decisions. We show that it is optimal for each manufacturer to offer a cost-plus contract. In the case of two manufacturers this result allows us to characterize an equilibrium in which the retailer's choice maximizes the supply chain profit, each manufacturer makes a profit equal to its marginal contribution to the supply chain, and the retailer takes the remaining profit. We also find that while increasing demand correlation always benefits the retailer, it benefits the manufacturers only when the production costs are convex. This suggests that category level advertising is beneficial for all parties only when the manufacturers' costs are convex. Finally, we show that the equilibrium results remain true for the case with more than two manufacturers under a submodularity property, which holds in the case of quadratic costs and linear demand.
邵鲁生简介：墨尔本大学商业与经济学院管理与市场系副教授，悉尼大学商学院运营与商务分析博士，东北大学管理学院优秀校友。主要从事运营与供应链管理研究，包括供应链竞争、合同及激励机制、可持续运营等，已经公开发表十多篇论文，包括Operations Research，Production and Operations Management，Decision Sciences, European Journal of Operational Research, International Journal of Production Economics, International Journal of Production Research等国际顶级或主流期刊。目前担任国际期刊Decision Science Journal副编辑、Production and Operations Management编审委员会成员。